Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 4

Article 8

1993

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Consumer
Protection Act Inapplicable to Consumer Cash on
Delivery Transactions
Thomas Melody

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Thomas Melody Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Consumer Protection Act Inapplicable to Consumer Cash on Delivery Transactions, 5
Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 128 (1993).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol5/iss4/8

This Recent Case is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Recent Cases

I

ciation. The Association, however, did
not approve the course until the summer of 1990. Although the 1985-1987
academic catalogue correctly stated that
the "University will apply for full accreditation with the NSRA, which is
expected in 1986," the next catalogue,
issued for 1987-1989, contained a false
statement of accreditation.
The catalogue also included a section on the University's School of
Applied and Continuing Education,
which offered the court reporting program. Although this section listed the
accrediting agencies that had approved
other programs within this school, it
did not contain any accreditation statement relating to the court reporting
program.
Within one week after Washburn
noticed the false claim of accreditation,
it began placing white tape over the
statement in all undistributed catalogues. In addition, the Washburn
administration conducted announcements to classes regarding the error and
stating that the University was presently seeking accreditation. All other
brochures available to students correctly stated that Washburn sought accreditation for the course.
Several court reporting students filed
a lawsuit against Washburn alleging
that the false statement of accreditation
in the catalogue was a violation of the
Kansas Consumer Protection Act

("Act"),

KAN. STAT. ANN.

50-623 to

50-644 (1973).
The students also
claimed the University committed
"educational malpractice" in its conduct and supervision of the court reporting program.
The trial court granted judgment for
Washburn, noting that it was necessary
for the students to show that Washburn's
violation of the Act had caused them
some injury. The students appealed
this decision to the Kansas Supreme
Court.

Siudents' Claims
The students, who did not claim that
they relied on the false statement of
128

accreditation when they enrolled at
Washburn, argued that the Act did not
require proof of reliance on the false
statement. The students contended that
the Act merely required them to show
that they were consumers engaged in a
consumer transaction with Washburn
and further, that Washburn committed
an act defined as "deceptive" under the
Act. Moreover, since the Kansas Attorney General was allowed to bring a
suit under the Act without bringing it
on behalf of an "aggrieved consumer,"
the students asserted that they too should
be allowed to sue, even if they were not
aggrieved.

Causal Connection Required Under
the Act
The Supreme Court of Kansas upheld the trial court's grant of judgment
in favor of Washburn. Although the
false statement of accreditation was a
per se violation of the Act under this
amendment, the court indicated that
this actual violation was not sufficient
to allow the students to recover. Accordingly, the court held that a consumer could not recover under the Act
without a showing that the consumer
was aggrieved by the violation.
In its decision, the court relied upon
the definition of "aggrieved" included
in an earlier Kansas Supreme Court
case, FairfaxDrainageDist. v. City of
Kansas City, 374 P.2d 35 (Kan. 1962).
In Fairfax,the court said an aggrieved
party was someone who had a substantial grievance, who had been denied a
personal or property right, or upon
whom a burden or obligation had been
imposed. The court found that the
students had not met this standard because they had not relied on the false
statement of accreditation. In fact,
many were unaware of the statement.
The court also noted that the students
had not suffered any loss or injury
because of the false statement. Accordingly, although the students were consumers under the Act, they were not
aggrieved by Washburn's violation of
that act.

Educational Malpractice Not a
Recognized Claim
The Kansas Supreme Court also
upheld the trial court'sjudgment on the
claim of educational malpractice, noting that no American court has recognized this as a legal claim. The students
based their argument on the low pass
rates of Washburn students taking the
statewide certification examination.
While the court acknowledged these
statistics, it noted that there was no
proof that the instruction in the court
reporting course caused the low pass
rates.
According to the court, several public policy concerns weighed against
recognizing a new cause of action for
educational malpractice. The court
identified the lack of a measurable
standard of care and the potential for a
flood of lawsuits as compelling policy
reasons against recognizing a tort claim
for educational malpractice. In addition, the court was reluctant to involve
the state's courts in monitoring the
daily operations of schools. Finally,
the court noted that the difficulties in
establishing a causal connection between the educational process and an
individual student's success also
weighed against recognizing this new
type of tort claim. o**
- JoAnne Juliano Giger

Fair Debt Collection
PracticesAct and
Consumer Protection Act
Inapplicable to Consumer
Cash on Delivery
Transactions
In Sterling Mirror of Maryland,
Inc. v. Gordon, 619 A.2d 64, (D.C.
App. 1993), the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals held that neither the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act nor
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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the Consumer Credit Protection Act
covered cash on delivery consumer
transactions. Consequently, a claim
for damages arising from consumer
transactions in which the contract balance was paid upon delivery or installation could not be maintained under
either act.
Smoke and Mirrors
Mr. and Mrs. John Gordon (the
"Gordons") contracted with Sterling
Mirror of Maryland, Inc. ("Sterling")
for the installation of mirrors in their
home. The contract required a deposit
before delivery of the mirrors and payment of the balance upon delivery and
installation.
After Sterling delivered and installed
the mirrors at the Gordons' house, a
dispute arose about a chip in one of the
mirrors. The Gordons and Sterling
failed to reach an agreement concerning the chipped mirror. Consequently,
the Gordons refused to pay the balance
of the contract, which totaled
$4,207.50.
In an effort to collect the amount
due on the contract, a Sterling employee telephoned Mrs. Gordon numerous times at her workplace. When
these attempts proved unsuccessful,
Sterling sued the Gordons for the balance of the contract. The Gordons,
however, counterclaimed against Sterling, seeking damages for the harassment Mrs. Gordon allegedly suffered
from Sterling's telephone calls.
The trial court concluded that the
Gordons owed Sterling a portion of the
outstanding balance, amounting to $695,
under the contract. However, the court
also awarded Mrs. Gordon one-thousand dollars for damages arising from
the telephone calls to her workplace.
Sterling objected to the award of damages to Mrs. Gordon and consequently
appealed this decision.

No Legally Recognized Claim
On appeal, Sterling contended that
Mrs. Gordon failed to state a legally
recognized claim from which damages
Volume 5 Number 4 / Summer 1993

could be awarded. Sterling argued that
neither the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") nor the Consumer Credit Protection Act ("CCPA"),
statutes upon which the lower court
based its decision, applied. Furthermore, Sterling stated that no non-statutory provisions provided any basis for
Mrs. Gordon's claim.
The appellate court agreed with
Sterling's argument. First, the court
held that the Debt Act only applied to
parties collecting debts on behalf of
others. The court stated that the Debt
Act, by its own terms, applied only to
professional debt collectors, which the
Act defined as people who regularly
collect or attempt to collect debts owed
to another. Furthermore, the plain
language of the Debt Act specifically
excluded from coverage "any officer
or employee of a creditor, while in the
name of the creditor, collecting debts
from such creditor." Therefore, court
reasoned that Mrs. Gordon could not
base her claim on the Debt Act, because
it did not apply to actions of a creditor
attempting to collect its own debts
directly from the debtor.
The court next addressed Mrs.
Gordon's claim under the Protection
Act and concluded that the Act provided no basis upon which Mrs. Gordon could state a claim. In its determination, the court first stated that the
Protection Act only applied to "actions
to enforce rights arising from a consumer credit sale or a direct installment
loan." The court noted that the Protection Act defined a consumer credit sale
as a sale of goods or services in which
credit was extended by the seller to the
buyer for amounts less than $25,000,
and the debt was payable in installments or subject to a finance charge.
Additionally, a direct installment loan
primarily accesses a line of credit for
the borrower that is repaid in equal
installments. The court concluded that
the contract between the Gordons and
Sterling was neither a consumer credit
sale nor a direct installment loan but
rather a cash on delivery transaction.
Therefore, it held that Mrs. Gordon
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was unable to state any action under the
Protection Act.
Furthermore, the appellate court
concluded that Mrs. Gordon failed to
state any non-statutory basis for her
claim. The court reasoned that the only
non-statutory basis on which Mrs. Gordon could have relied was the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
However, the court found that Sterling's
conduct was not sufficiently outrageous
nor extreme to support an action under
this theory. Consequently, the court
dismissed Mrs. Gordon's claim under
this basis of recovery.
Basis of Decisionat Issue
The court noted that it based all of its
determinations upon a partial transcript
supplied by Sterling. It also stated that
the court did not have a copy of Mrs.
Gordon's counterclaim. However, the
court concluded that it adequately considered all possible statutory and nonstatutory theories that might have been
alleged in Mrs. Gordon's claim.
In support of its decision, the court
noted that Sterling maintained the burden of presenting a record sufficient to
demonstrate that the Gordons failed to
prove a legally recognized claim. The
court found that Sterling sustained this
burden. Furthermore, the court noted
the Mrs. Gordon had a duty to supply
the court with any relevant information
which had been omitted by Sterling.
Because Mrs. Gordon failed to produce
more information or to contend that
Sterling failed to supply all relevant
portions of the record, the court justified its reliance on the record presented
by Sterling.
Thus, the court held that the record
sufficiently demonstrated the Mrs.
Gordon failed to prove a legally recognized claim that entitled her to damages
from Sterling's telephone calls. Consequently, the appellate court reversed
the judgment of the lower court.
Dissent Argues that the Record is
Inadequate
A strong dissent argued that the
record before the court was insufficient

I

Recent Cases

to overturn the trial court's decision.
The dissenting judge stated that the
party seeking reversal bears the burden
of presenting a record sufficient to
demonstrate that error occurred. Consequently, when that party fails to sustain its burden, the court lacks discretion to reverse the lower court. The
dissent claimed that Sterling failed
to meet its burden and therefore,
the trial court's opinion should be
affirmed. 4Thomas Melody

Health Care Contracts May
Not Unfairly Limit
Uninsured Motorist
Compensation
In Brown v. Snohomish County
Physicians Corp., 845 F.2d 334 (Wash.
1993), the Supreme Court of Washington invalidated provisions in health
care service contracts that excluded
medical coverage to the extent benefits
were available through uninsured or
underinsured motorist coverage. The
court found that the provisions violated
public policy favoring full compensation for innocent automobile accident
victims. Accordingly, the restrictive
contract provisions were held to be
enforceable only after accident victims
were compensated for general and nonduplicative special damages.
ContractProvisions Unjustly
RestrictedMedicalCoverage
In two related cases, a health care
service contractor denied automobile
accident victims complete reimbursement for medical expenses. In refusing
coverage, the contractor relied on contract provisions that provided compensation only to the extent that the claims
130
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surpassed the benefits from uninsured
or underinsured motorists ("UIM")
policies. In each case, the victims, who
both maintained UIM coverage, received significantly less compensation
for injuries than otherwise available
absent the contract provision.
In the first case, Ray Brown
("Brown") suffered serious injuries after
an automobile struck him. Medical
expenses for his injuries, as well as
damages for lost wages and pain and
suffering, totaled in excess of$160,000.
Public Employees Mutual Insurance
Company ("PEMCO"), the insurer of
both the driver and victim, paid the
limits of their respective policies: the
driver's liability insurance of $25,000,
no-fault medical coverage of $10,000,
and Brown's UIM coverage of $50,000
and personal injury protection of
$10,000.
Through his employer, Brown also
maintained a health care service contract with Snohomish County Physicians' Corporation ("SCPC"). SCPC,
however, limited Brown's recovery to
medical expenses above $70,000, stating that the contract contained a provision which limited recovery if the patient had access to UIM coverage, automobile "no-fault," or other similar
medical coverage. According to SCPC,
the provision applied to Brown's
$50,000 of UIM coverage, his $10,000
of personal injury protection coverage,
and the driver's $10,000 of no-fault
medical coverage, totaling the $70,000
for which SCPC maintained no responsibility.
Absent such provisions, Brown could
retain his $50,000 of UIM coverage.
Theoretically, the UIM coverage would
have compensated Brown for general
and special damages beyond ordinary
medical expenses. However, the provision effectively precluded the UIM
coverage as an avenue of recovery for
lost wages or pain and suffering damages.
Brown sought ajudgment invalidating the policy provision. The trial
court, however, rejected Brown's argument that the provision was unen-

forceable as against public policy.
Brown appealed this decision.
In the companion case, Ross Hogsett
("Hogsett") died from injuries sustained
in an automobile accident with an
uninsured driver. Hogsett's personal
injury protection coverage paid the
first $10,000 of medical expenses.
However, a dispute arose as to whether
SCPC or UIM coverage would compensate Hogsett for the remaining
$24,277.13 in medical bills. SCPC
claimed that a health care service contract provision, similar to the one in
Brown's case, precluded compensation
from SCPC because Hogsett had adequate UIM protection.
Hogsett's widow sought judgment
against SCPC declaring the restrictive
provision invalid, as well as injunctive
relief and damages under the Consumer Protection Act. The trial court,
however, denied Hogsett's motion.
Hogsett filed a timely appeal of this
decision.
The appellate courts affirmed the
judgments in both of the cases. The
Supreme Court of Washington, however, granted discretionary review of
both cases.
Principlesof InsuranceLaw Apply
The Supreme Court of Washington
first noted that in resolving the public
policy issue, the general rules governing insurance policies applied to the
health care service contracts. The court
stated that insurance companies may
limit liability if the restrictions are
consistent with public policy. However, the court also warned that violations of public policy may warrant
judicial intervention to invalidate the
unacceptable provision.
In evaluating the validity of the
provisions, the court relied on prior
Washington Supreme Court precedent
and extended the rule that an insurer
may recover only the excess that remains after the insured is fully compensated for a loss caused by another's
negligence. The court advocated the
rule as illustrative of a socially desirable policy that promotes the adequate
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